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Abstract

The United States of America has accomplished some advanced technological and
developmental achievements recently. However, in order to better its abilities to
reconstruct and stabilize nations in the future it must utilize the lessons it has learned
from the past as well as these technological advancements. From both Africa and the
Middle East, the United States has learned some valuable lessons in helping nations
rebuild in the face of danger. Currently, the United States can use internet technologies to
better educate those who would want to reconstruct their own nations as a united people
group with as little foreign interference as possible. This in combination with past lessons
learned can help the United States to become more efficient and capable of reconstructing
post-war nations.
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Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lessons In Technology
Learning from Africa and the Middle East
Literature Review
There are many articles and papers on the experiences that the United States of
America has had in the various countries where it has tried to help rebuild and even
improve war-torn and disaster-stricken nations. Some of these are written by African aid
beneficiaries as they have received the impact of nation-building efforts for the last fifty
years, while others are written by academics here in the United States or abroad such as
the Middle East. The sources used in this paper contain many facts and arguments that
will help to determine the best path for the United States to take in the future.
Africa presented the United States with many unique challenges, as addressed by
many organizations and researchers. The case study “Post Conflict Reconstruction in
Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone,” by Gunter Bender, describes how and why there are
still many challenges in this war-torn area and stresses the importance of supporting
grass-roots efforts from within the country to rebuild its nation. Once one can help to
balance the socioeconomic inequalities present, the people themselves will be galvanized
to enact change for the better on their own populace’s terms instead of nation builders
like the United States.1 The Conflict Management Division of PeaceAU (African Union)
details the current policies in place that the United Nations has had a part in
reconstructing and developing the nations therein.2 The peacebuilding efforts of the UN

1. Gunter Bender, “Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone,”
ProQuest.com, June 2011, accessed from http://www.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.
com/docview/917453436?accountid=12085 (accessed January 12, 2014).
2. Conflict Management Division, “Policy on Post-Conflict,” PeaceAU.org, July, 2006, accessed
from http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwowork-eng.pdf (accessed August 26, 2013).
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worldwide and the mixed results thereof are addressed in Albert Cutillo’s article for the
International Peace Institute, “International Assistance to Countries Emerging from
Conflict.” Cutillo addresses the debate on how best to proceed in this area and how it has
been translated into the operational side of things around the world.3 Pierre Englebert and
Denis Tull’s essay on Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa takes on the American
reconstruction efforts throughout the African states. In this essay they list three “flawed
assumptions” that Western state institutions have put stock in so that they may assist in
the rebuilding of the failed states in Africa, similar to how Bender’s views on how we can
learn from Sierra Leone.4 The Center for Technology and National Security Policy puts
out Defense and Technology Papers on various international policy issues. Their article
“Learning from Darfur” argues that the key to support Africans in their desire to rebuild
from decades of conflict is to partner with the various states that are willing in order to
help develop their technologies and infrastructure and enable their own people to stop
mass killings before they start so that they can survive without foreign intervention over
every incident that pops up.5 Alcira Kreimer’s Uganda details the World Bank’s
experience with the post conflict reconstruction effort in Uganda and how they have

3. Albert Cutillo, “International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict,” IPInst.org,
February, 2006, accessed from http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/cutillo_e_rpt.pdf (accessed
November 20, 2013).
4. Pierre Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa,” Pomona.edu, September 19, 2007,
accessed from www.politics.pomona.edu/penglebert/State%20Rec%20Paper%20IS%20R&R%20Sep%
2019%2007.pdf (accessed September 5, 2013).
5. David Gompert, Courtney Richardson, Richard Kugler, and Clifford Bernath, “Learning from
Darfur,” CTNSP.DODlive.mil, July, 2005, accessed from http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/2005/07/15/dtp-015learning-from-darfur-building-a-net-capable-african-force-to-stop-mass-killing-2/ (accessed October 16,
2013).
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achieved some success, but also explains why there continue to be shortcomings in the
long-term stabilization of the Ugandan state.6
The Middle East has its own share of problematic issues as well, though their
complications are unique to the region. Stuart Bowen’s article, “Wanted,” lists some of
the things that he had noticed while abroad in Iraq. He lists how the United States was
handling the nation reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Bowen suggests creating the United
States Office for Contingency Operations as an alternative method to save money and
even lives in the future as they could use the same new organization for future
reconstruction and nation building efforts.7 Ambassador Paul Bremer describes, in his
2003 transcript of a briefing he held from Baghdad, Iraq, the current status of America’s
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and how he thought they were doing compared to their
goals. He further explains that they need to partner closely with the Iraqi people if they
want to enable them to be self-sufficient. He also warns that fixing the economy could
take quite a while. Bremer concludes his briefing by detailing how the United States has
set up the interim Iraqi government in hopes of establishing something more permanent
in the future.8 The geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor publishes new essays most
weeks that touch on relevant policy concerns as well. Robert Kaplan of Stratfor wrote
“The Death of Defense,” in which he describes how Americans are ready and willing to
commit to a smaller military presence worldwide, as they are sick and tired of the wars in

6. Alcira Kreimer, Uganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Country Case Evaluation (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 2000).
7. Stuart Bowen, “Wanted,” DefenseOne.com, July 31, 2013, accessed from
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/07/someone-watch-over-oco-why-pentagon-needs-permanentnation-building-watchdog/67865/ (accessed August 28, 2013).
8. Paul Bremer, “Briefing on Reconstruction Efforts,” Defense.gov, June 12, 2003, accessed from
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2737 (accessed August 28, 2013).
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the Middle East and elsewhere. However, the threats in today’s world are often far more
complex and hidden than ever before, warranting a large force capable of handling threats
globally because no one is willing or able to take over the spot the United States now
holds.9 Robert Orr writes in Winning the Peace: an American Strategy for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction on how the post-conflict situations in many of these nations create a
power vacuum that is conducive to terrorist cells and their growing exploitation of the
people groups within in his book.10 He further discloses that if regional stability and
economic stability are to be maintained, then the United States needs to come up with a
better strategy for post-conflict reconstruction. Without a more effective strategy, these
nations will continue to be plagued by terrorist cells and will see more violence spread
throughout the region. Andrew Rathmell in “Planning post-conflict reconstruction in
Iraq: What can we learn?” delves into how the number of reconstruction and
peacekeeping efforts by the UN has skyrocketed and the American military has assumed
the role not only of being peacekeepers, but also the role of being a temporary system of
governance. He further claims that Iraq has been the most “ambitious and demanding” of
America’s reconstruction efforts to date.11 The Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction’s “Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” describes the
way that Iraq in particular has been handled and suggests ten ideas that could help to
reform the stabilization and reconstruction methods that will be used in the future. Much

9. Robert Kaplan, “The Slow Death of Defense,” Stratfor.com, October 30, 2013, accessed from
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/slow-death-defense (accessed November 22, 2013).
10. Robert Orr, Winning the Peace: an American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction
(Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004).
11. Andrew Rathmell, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?,”
OnlineLibrary.Wiley.com, October, 2005, accessed from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14682346.2005.00500.x/full (accessed January 14, 2014).
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like in his later work, the Special Inspector (Stuart Bowen) proposes the organization of
the USOCO in this report in order to better handle reconstruction efforts in the future.12
Jos Van Gennip admits in his article “Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development”
that post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and in Iraq have been
“enormously challenging.”13 This article asserts that there are many reasons for
reconstruction, it is not simply a tool used to subjugate other nations to the builder
nation’s will, but in fact can be very helpful to nations who are constantly being
terrorized by local warlords and would-be tyrants, though there are many challenges, as
stated above.
The history of post-conflict reconstruction goes back a few decades and there are
many who have dedicated and continue to dedicate their work to developing new
technologies to better assist nations in the future as well. Marc Cogen’s and Eric De
Brabandere’s “Democratic Governance and Post-conflict Reconstruction” lists what
Cogen and Brabandere consider to be the three constitutive elements of democracy that
are crucial in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, especially in nations that do not have a
democratic history.14 Sanam Anderlini and Judy El-Bushra detail in “Post Conflict
Reconstruction” the kind of relief efforts needed to help nations rebuild in the face of

12. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations,” SIGIR.mil, February, 2010, accessed from http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/
archive/sigir/20131001125112/http://www.sigir.mil/files/USOCO/ApplyingHardLessons.pdf (accessed
August 28, 2013).
13. Jos Van Gennip, “Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development,” ProQuest.com, 2005,
accessed from http://www.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/216909452?
accountid=12085 (accessed January 13, 2014).
14. Marc Cogen and Eric De Brabandere, “Democratic Governance and Post-conflict
Reconstruction,” ProQuest.com, September, 2007, accessed from http://www.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=
http://search.proquest.com/docview/219584507?accountid=12085 (accessed January 15, 2014).
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ending conflicts and the effects of the reconstruction process on women.15 The book
Governance in Post-conflict Societies, published by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and edited by Derick Brinkerhoff, is divided into three sections
which delves into the history of nation building before exploring the “evolving role of the
US military” and then into how one can use the structures of local governance to
strengthen new statewide structures.16 Much like Bender, Marcus Cox in “State Building
and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia,” extrapolates more helpful
methods of state reconstruction. Cox collects data from the international effort to help
Bosnia instead of Bender’s case study in Sierra Leone.17 Infodev’s article “The Role of
Information and Communication Technologies in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” by
Nicholas Friederici states that every post-conflict situation is different and should each be
handled individually, though each situation shares common characteristics as information
and communication technologies can go a long way towards helping countries begin to
build again, especially economically.18 Sybert Liebenberg and Richard Gueli conclude
“Assessment Framework” by finding that post-disaster and post-conflict situations are
very similar, so the basis of the technological tools used to help the nations in need

15. Sanam Anderlini and Judy El-Bushra, “Post Conflict Reconstruction,” InclusiveSecurity.org,
April 2012, accessed from http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/39_post_
conflict.pdf (accessed January 12, 2014).

16. Derick Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies Rebuilding Fragile States (London:
Routledge, 2007).
17 . Marcus Cox, “State Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia,”
CASIN.ch, January, 2001, accessed from http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/102385/
ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5CDDE3C1-0604-4AD4-BE0E-66A4D2ADF05/
en/2001_01_State_Building_and_Post-Conflict_Reconstruction.pdf (accessed January 12, 2014).
18. Nicholas Friederici, “The Role of ICT in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” InfoDev.org, June,
2013, accessed from http://infodev.org/infodev-files/ict_post-conflict_final_07102013.pdf (accessed
September 1, 2013).
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should be similar. Both situations would require the same aid techniques, yet
understandably in a different context.19 Carlos Lopes writes on development in
“Mediation, Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Post-conflict Reconstruction” and lends
his take on the recent missteps of the United Nations. Lopes lists three key dilemmas as
to why there are increasingly fewer resolved disputes and also an increase in failed
peacekeeping efforts in the more war-torn regions: the lack of distinction between
civilians and combatants, the changing nature of combatants, and the blurring of lines
between “military and criminal activities and between military and humanitarian/
development activities.”20 Monte Palmer’s work, The Dilemmas of Political
Development, discusses how a stark minority of nations control the vast majority of the
planet’s wealth and thus end up sending aid and establishing development initiatives in
the more conflict-ridden regions. Political development must advance in these regions if
these war-torn states are to achieve an “overall development in society” as well as
advance economically. 21
Data
As Kaplan puts it, the United States has had a worldwide military presence since
the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.22 The UN has responsibility for keeping peace
worldwide, but it is the United States that provides the backbone for their forces.

19. Sybert Liebenberg, “Assessment Framework,” CSIR.co.za, March 2006, accessed from
http://www.csir.co.za/websource/ptl0002/pdf_files/media/2006/Paper1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2013).
20. Carlos Lopes, “Mediation, Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Post-conflict Reconstruction,”
Scribd.com, December 1, 2011, accessed from http://www.scribd.com/doc/89191644/DevelopmentDialogue-no-57 (accessed January 11, 2014).
21. Monte Palmer, The Dilemmas of Political Development; an Introduction to the Politics of the
Developing Areas (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1973).
22. Kaplan, “The Slow Death of Defense.”
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Additionally, the United States takes independent action quite often due to the
bureaucratic nature of the UN. The UN has conducted 19 complex military operations
around the world since 1989 in order to rebuild nations and help to quell the violence in
nations that were still at war. Ten of these operations have taken place in African states.
Englebert notes that despite the best efforts of the UN, very few of these operations were
actually successful and the UN had difficulty in establishing self-sustaining institutions.23
UN and French troops were unable to prevent election violence in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, despite having 17,000 peacekeepers and 2,500 European Union
troops in the area. Englebert reports that conflict actually rose during the 2006 elections.
Even worldwide, peace building efforts have not gotten to the level that the UN would
like them to be as compared to their peacekeeping and humanitarian activities during the
last decade.24 The UN forces located in Africa at the end of 2005 were composed of
82.4% of all UN peacekeeping forces worldwide.25 The conflicts in question have killed
or displaced millions across the African states, such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Angola.26 The UN’s hopeful goals of restoring
these failed states is a flawed premise, as the majority of African states were never
“constituted repositories of power and authority” in the first place, but were always ruled
by authoritarian leaders who took advantage of any power they may have held.27 The
United States and other Western societies have begun to realize that they need to support

23. Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa.”
24. Cutillo, “International Assistance to Countries.”
25. Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa.”
26. Conflict Management Division, “Policy on Post-Conflict.”
27. Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa.”

RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS

12

the AU’s philosophy to “African Solutions to African Problems” and Americans can use
technology in the future to better help train and prepare the future leaders in Africa to
lead their respective countries.28 However, it is not just Africa that has had conflicts in
the past and that needs foreign aid and assistance in order for them to rebuild and to get
back on their feet.
Stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been going on in Iraq and
Afghanistan for the last nine years, but have been plagued by military/civilian integration
problems and mismanagement.29 These “SROs” (Stabilization Reconstruction
Operations) encompass all military and civilian activities “across the full spectrum of a
conflict.”30 As Bowen mentions, no one was really sure “who was in charge” during
individual SROs and this led to significant waste and poor oversight on the operations.31
Even in 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer was not sure how long it would take to rebuild
Iraq; he avoided stating any specific timelines.32 In fact, there is no centrally planned
organization in Iraq that is taking the lead and neither USAID nor the State Department
has the manpower for extended stability operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.33
Ambassador John Herbst is quoted as saying that the United States needs “a corps of
dedicated civilian professionals in order to conduct these stabilization operations well.”34

28. Gompert, “Learning from Darfur.”
29. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations.”
30. Ibid.
31. Bowen, “Wanted.”
32. Bremer, “Briefing on Reconstruction Efforts.”
33. Bowen, “Wanted.”
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The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction similarly suggests that a central
organization to handle post-conflict reconstruction in these and other countries in the
future could be best exemplified by the new organization, the U.S. Office for
Contingency Operations.35 SROs are not a new thing for the United States as it has
engaged in fifteen of them since World War II, though this is the first time that oversight
was set up over the operation so that they have been able to learn from their mistakes and
what they can do better in the future.36 In 2003, President Bush organized the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, though this organization never fully
subsumed the responsibilities that it was created to have. It was quickly replaced by the
Coalition Provisional Authority who absorbed what was left of ORHA, though it too
lacked information technology, personnel, and the financial resources to fully carry out
its specific missions.37 Both situations in Africa and the Middle East can be assisted by
this USOCO as this new organization is meant to be able to used exclusively for nation
rebuilding in the future with the kind of resources that only a top-down method can
provide.38
The UN has undertaken peace building around the world since its inception at the
conclusion of World War II.39 Peace building is the framework in which post-conflict
countries should be assisted by external sources through peacekeeping, humanitarian aid,
34. Ibid.
35. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations.”
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Bowen, “Wanted.”
39. Cutillo, “International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict.”
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and development cooperation.40 Information and communications technologies fall under
development and can bring tangible economic benefits after being re-established in the
post-conflict nation.41 The ultimate objective for post-disaster and post-conflict nations is
to develop a path to sustainable development so that the nation in question can avoid
being put into such a situation again in the future.42
Analysis
Over the past few decades the United States of America has accomplished some
very advanced technological and developmental achievements. In order to better their
abilities to reconstruct and stabilize nations in the future they must utilize the lessons they
have learned from the past as well as these technological advancements. From their
experiences in Africa with its ever changing political landscape, as well as their more
recent efforts in the Middle East, they have learned some valuable lessons in how to
approach helping nations rebuild in the face of danger. In addition to these lessons, they
have also passed some very important milestones in technology and now have the ability
to access information almost anywhere in the world. This new globally linked network
can be used to better educate those who would want to reconstruct their own nations as a
united people group with as little foreign interference as possible, while also enabling the
United States to train up leaders in their own communities. This training empowers
people to save their own nations without causing the United States to be seen as a new
imperialistic power, bent on setting up satellite “Americas” around the world. In

40. Ibid.
41. Friederici, “The Role of ICT in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
42. Liebenberg, “Assessment Framework.”
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combination with their past lessons, this newfound empowerment can help them to
become more efficient and capable of reconstructing post-war nations and to help
stabilize their economy and set up their new system of governance. However, it is very
possible that American efforts thus far have only solidified the fact that they should not
be engaged in nation building at all and that they should let countries develop on their
own.
While the United States of America has been seen as the “world police” since
1941, according to Kaplan, it only attempts to be involved in situations that no one else
can or will get involved in order to help out a hurting people group.43 It does not matter
where on Earth this group is located, the United States military will do its best to protect
innocent lives and to promote the cause of liberty. The experiences that the United States
has gained with aiding in post-war reconstruction and stabilization in the various African
states over the years has taught it many valuable lessons about what it can and cannot
achieve in tumultuous areas. Since 1989, there have been 10 relief efforts by the United
Nations in Africa to help support the transition from war to peace and to rebuild
governing institutions so that the African states could regain sovereignty over their
borders and to effectively govern their respective populace.44
While the United States did have limited success in some of these countries, many
of them were plagued by violence for years to come, especially in the first stages of
transition. Even countries who did not explode with violent action have become
dependent on foreign aid and face inadequacies each year with their various issues and
governing policies. Because of this, the UN forces located in Africa at the end of 2005
43. Kaplan, “The Slow Death of Defense.”
44. Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa.”
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comprised 82.4% of all UN peacekeeping forces worldwide in order to help keep the
peace and prevent future outbreaks of violence.45 The conflicts in question have killed or
displaced millions across the African states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Angola.46 More and more of a percentage of
international terrorist activity and oil exports are coming from Africa, so this is affecting
the violence levels drastically in regards to toppling fledgling governments and
controlling the people of the various African states. Even America’s most lofty promises
seem circumspect when compared to the track record it has in attempting to rebuild and
stabilize the war-torn states.
The blame for the continual failure of African states to form effective and stable
governments can be traced to their past reliance on patronage of whatever colonial power
happened to be in charge of their regions at the time. Many Africans were taken as slaves
during the colonialist time period of the world and their governing authorities exploited
them to export products to other more civilized nations in order to be refined into usable
goods and even services. Since they never really were able to get a grasp on being actual
producers, trying to set up a government run by the people and expecting them to survive
in the global economy could be compared to handing a teenager a credit card who has
never had to budget anything in their lives, and expecting them not to run the card up past
its limit. To put it another way, it would be like giving a brand new manual-transmission
car to a 16 year old who has had no driving experience and expecting them to not stall out
on the interstate while trying to shift gears and merge through 4 lane traffic at the same

45. Ibid.
46. Conflict Management Division, “Policy on Post-Conflict.”
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time. These nations have no experience with self-government to draw from. They have
continually found themselves in a cyclical pattern of building, becoming corrupt, and
eventually falling back apart into separate factions. Each wanted different things until
war once more devastates everyone. Then the UN comes back in to try and set up the
dominoes of fate once more so that these states can knock them over again.47
The UN’s hopeful goals of restoring these failed states is a flawed premise, as the
majority of African states were never “constituted repositories of power and authority” in
the first place, but were always ruled by authoritarian leaders who took advantage of any
power they may have held.48 These leaders took advantage of their power to cause the
failures of their respective states. It is not as if the African states are obstinately refusing
help, it is just that the methods being used thus far are ineffective and end up being a
waste of time. Englebert also points out that there is a flaw in the logic of cooperation
between the donor states and the state being rebuilt. “Local elites maximize personal or
factional benefits from political instability and outsiders’ reconstruction efforts,” which
casts doubts on the continuance of reconstruction efforts when the donor nations end up
lining the pockets of the corrupt.49 The third flaw that Englebert and Tull notice is the
inconsistency in the reasons behind the donor nation’s generosity. Some help with the
reconstruction efforts just so that they might gain political favor in their home country,
while abandoning the cause when it falls out of the limelight. They only end up helping
in the short term, preventing the post-conflict nation from gaining any long-term ground
as their flow of support wavers as donors sign on or abandon their cause.
47. Englebert, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa.”
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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The United States and other Western societies have begun to realize that they
need to support the AU’s philosophy for “African Solutions to African Problems” and
they can use technology in the future to better help train and prepare the future leaders in
Africa to lead their respective countries, especially in the area of preventing mass killings
and genocides.50 According to Bender’s “Lessons from Sierra Leone,” the main issue is
the returning conflicts of local warring tribes and the failures of most UN charity
programs to address the root cause of the ever-present instability in the central African
region. He even goes on to call these peace treaties “paper tigers” that have no real
substance but look good for the countries that supported them in the first place.51
At the end of the day, only the local citizens know what is truly best for their
newly developing nations. Having bureaucrats in far-off lands deciding how best to spend
their aid money is not the best option at all. Thus, setting up “local and broadly
representative councils” should take charge of any and all reconstruction proceedings in
place of foreign nation builders.52 Africans must take the lead in any of these efforts if
they are to succeed because they cannot rely on foreigners to baby-sit them forever; they
need to stand on their own at some point.53 Also, any efforts or defense forces organized
in order to protect the peace in Africa must be prepared and authorized to “fight and
win.”54 They cannot do this alone though, and will still need to cooperate with western
nations as they can receive more specialized training and learn how to better make use of

50. Gompert, “Learning from Darfur.”
51. Bender, “Lessons from Sierra Leone.”
52. Van Gennip, “Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development.”
53. Gompert, “Learning from Darfur.”
54. Ibid.
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the resources that they possess naturally in order to stabilize their nations. Stabilization is
just the first step of the process and the Conflict Management Division of PeaceAU
recognizes this and states, “Post-conflict reconstruction and development activities do not
stop with stabilization, but seek to achieve long-term sustainable development as
underpinned by the African vision of regeneration and growth.”55 However, it is not just
Africa that has had conflicts in the past and that needs foreign aid and assistance in order
for them to rebuild and to get back on their feet. Something needs to happen in the future
if America is to set these nations up permanently for the benefit of the innocent lives that
did not choose for their birthplace to constantly be engaged in turmoil and political
upheavals.
The Middle East has dominated the American news cycles, as well as Uncle
Sam’s wallet, for the better part of the last decade. Africa is not alone is having disasters
and conflicts strike their homelands, and they are not the only ones to receive aid from
America’s seemingly-never-ending coffers. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts have
been going on in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last nine years, but have been plagued by
military/civilian integration problems and mismanagement.56 Though oversight is usually
typical of any government run organization or activity, there has been a severe lack of
such in the relief efforts to the Middle East. Instead of allowing each participating office
or organization to stick to doing what they know best, the stabilization and reconstruction
operations were split up between groups when they really should not have been. These
“SROs” encompass all military and civilian activities “across the full spectrum of a

55. Conflict Management Division, “Policy on Post-Conflict.”
56. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations.”
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conflict.”57 Instead of having these operations spread out so thinly, it would’ve been
better to consolidate them into just a handful of organizations. As Bowen mentions, no
one was really sure “who was in charge” during individual SROs and this led to
significant waste and poor oversight on the operations.58 Even in 2003, Ambassador Paul
Bremer was not sure how long it would take to rebuild Iraq; he avoided stating any
specific timelines.59 He knew that it would take months or even years, but it is doubtful
that even he could’ve imagined that it would go on for a decade with still no conclusive
end in sight.
The fact is, there is no centrally planned organization in Iraq that is taking the lead
and neither USAID, nor the State Department, has the manpower for extended stability
operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.60 Ambassador John Herbst says that the
United States needs “a corps of dedicated civilian professionals in order to conduct these
stabilization operations well.”61 The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
Stuart Bowen, similarly suggests that a central organization to handle post-conflict
reconstruction in these countries and even others in the future could be best exemplified
by the new organization, the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations.62 SROs are not a
new thing for the United States as they have engaged in fifteen of them since World War
II, though this is the first time that oversight was set up over the operation so that they
57. Ibid.
58. Bowen, “Wanted.”
59. Bremer, “Briefing on Reconstruction Efforts.”
60. Bowen, “Wanted.”
61. Ibid.
62. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Reform of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations.”
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have been able to learn from their mistakes and what they can do better in the future.63 In
2003, President Bush signed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
into existence, though this organization never fully subsumed the responsibilities that it
was created to have. It was quickly replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority who
absorbed what was left of ORHA, though it too lacked information technology,
personnel, and the financial resources to fully carry out its specific missions.64 A year
later, the government decided to switch the reins from the Department of Defense to the
Department of State in hopes that their more diplomatic and bureaucratic approach to
foreign policy could help organize the reconstruction efforts more efficiently throughout
the Middle East. It then set up two temporary organizations to oversee and plan new
operations, but ambiguities arose when lines were crossed during implementation. The
Department of Defense still controlled most of the contracting and workforce involved,
while the Department of State possess neither the experience or scope to lead and
organize such a large reconstruction effort.65
In order to alleviate all of the past problems in this area, both Bowen’s
independent article and his Special Inspector’s report suggest setting up the U.S. Office
for Contingency Operations. This organization would provide the top-down command
structure that would be required of such a large operation, while still being nuanced
enough to handle any problem thrown at it since each post-conflict or post-disaster
country is in a different situation. Creating another government organization is not ideal,

63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
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as America was meant to be a small federated republic, but consolidating American
efforts into a single organization like the USOCO instead of the myriad of bureaucracies
that the United States has governing the rebuilding nations now will save America
money, time, and resources in the future. Bowen even postulates that it could only cost
$25 million a year to fund this new organization by “field[ing] a dedicated civ-mil team
that could provide a level of reliability and accountability that simply was missing in Iraq
and Afghanistan and is still absent from our national security architecture.”66 Both
situations in Africa and the Middle East can be assisted by this USOCO as this new
organization is meant to be able to used exclusively for nation rebuilding in the future
with the kind of resources that only a top-down method can provide.67
Each individual post-conflict nation is very different than the rest and each
requires individual attention in order to best assist them in rebuilding their nation. One of
the more often overlooked ways to help get a nation up and running again is the
information and communications technologies that most countries rely upon for the basis
of their infrastructure and economic centers.68 While not every post-disaster or postconflict nation has the same issues in reconstruction, they all have commonalities that
could be relevant to ICT-enabled intervention.69 Once they can regain their economic
independence by using ICT to rebuild critical economic infrastructure, they can more
easily fund peace building activities in tandem with the United Nations and/or American
forces. The UN has been tasked with peace building around the world since its inception

66. Bowen, “Wanted.”
67. Ibid.
68. Friederici, “The Role of ICT in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
69. Ibid.
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at the conclusion of World War II.70 This is pretty well-known, though the UN has often
been far more competent at stirring up old rivalries and creating more problems than it
actually solves due to its system of coalitions of small nations that block anything that the
bigger nations try to accomplish and the gridlock between the United States of America,
Russia, and China. None of the three wants any of the others to gain too much from any
one deal so that the balance of power will not be shifted from its current spot.
Peacebuilding is the framework in which post-conflict countries should be assisted by
external sources through peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and development
cooperation.71 Information and communications technologies fall into the development
side of things, and can bring tangible economic benefits after being re-established in the
post-conflict nation.72
While not being the largest priority or even one of the primary goals in the
reconstruction of post-disaster and post-conflict nations, the ICT field can assist greatly
in jumpstarting the economy and in reconfiguring governmental infrastructure. Some
governments never had country-wide communication in the first place, but with the
advent of mobile technologies and equipment powered by alternative energy sources, as
seen at expos such as the annual STARS-Tides conference at the National Defense
University, these nations are now able to join the 21st century with a bang as they can
now interact on the global scale in order to get better trade values for their resources and
to enable more efficient communication lines so that the fledgling government can

70. Cutillo, “International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict.”
71. Ibid.
72. Friederici, “The Role of ICT in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
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adequately express its goals to the citizens and to nations abroad in order to prevent
misunderstandings in diplomacy and military policies that could very easily arise if no
communication was present.73 They now possess the technology capable of creating
completely closed off networks for developing nations and possibly small corporations
that can provide phone, internet, and data access for a select amount of people within the
coverage radius. These network devices are relatively cheap when compared to setting up
one’s own wired network nationwide and there are no monthly internet bills to deal with
either as it is all over the empty wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum. The
ultimate objective for post-disaster and post-conflict nations is to develop a path to
sustainable development so that the nation in question can avoid being put into such a
situation again in the future.74 If these nations are able to stand on their own, they will no
longer have to rely on some big-brother nation to come bail them out every time a wouldbe despot starts challenging their status quo. Once they are at the point of sustainable
development, these nations can start to become truly independent and can be welcomed
into the global community with pride.
Conclusion
Since 1776 the United States of America has done its best to be the “city on a
hill,” an example to nations around the world of what a free country can do and the
benefits of living in a society where people are not afraid to speak their mind or risk their
fortune on a new business venture. It has also more recently been dubbed the world
police as the United States has decided to use its wealth, resources, and manpower in

73. Ibid.
74. Liebenberg, “Assessment Framework.”
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order to make the world better for everyone, and not just for citizens of the United States.
The United States of America has had a long partnership with the United Nations in
assisting countries who have had tough situations occur within their borders, whether it
be a natural disaster, civil war, international conflict, genocide, or even civic oppression
of the minority. These most notably have occurred in the African states.
While there has been limited success within Africa, there have also been many
failures, not the least of which being Darfur. In order to move forward with helping these
nations, there needs to be a few changes made to the way the United States handles postconflict and post-disaster reconstruction efforts in Africa and abroad. They need to
recognize that the African state needs to take the lead on any specific projects being
attempted as they need to learn to rely on themselves with their foreign partner as only a
guide to get them started. Western nations as a whole need to learn that these
reconstruction efforts are not for gaining political favor, nor are these states up for grabs
again like they once thought during the colonialist period of history where European
countries raced to lay claim to the various African states, as well as nations around the
world. Also, any new systems or organizations set up in the future for Africa, or even
other nations, needs to have the authority and preparedness to fight and win in case of an
invading force, whether its domestic or foreign. They cannot be forced to sit on their
thumbs due to not having the proper clearance to defend their citizens. Similarly, the
work that is done to reconstruct their nations needs to consider the long-term goals of the
country and not just whatever will make them happy now. They must be enabled to run
their own governments so that they no longer depend on foreign help to fight their own
battles.
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Iraq and Afghanistan have taught the United States of America that there needs to
be better foresight and planning before rushing into a nation blind and confident that
everything will work out fine. It ends up in a bureaucratic nightmare as every
organization and piece of infrastructure is jury-rigged on the spot or assigned to a
department that might have no idea or precedents on how to proceed in the given
circumstance. The best way forward for alleviating this jury-rigged “nightmare” is to
create an organization much like the one that has been put forth by Bowen as an
alternative way to move forward in nation rebuilding. The Middle East could highly
benefit from an organization such as this, though it can be used in every future
circumstance as well. The U.S. Office for Contingency Operations would be able to
centralize all reconstruction efforts and do so with greater oversight and less overhead as
America would know where every dollar was going and would be able to re-evaluate the
situation as time went on to determine which methods or specific offices are not
contributing to the overall success of the USOCO.
This new nation reconstruction organization, along with working more closely
with the nations in question can greatly increase the American capacity to make a
difference in war-torn and disaster ridden areas. Together with new information and
communications technology policies, nations will be able to get back up on their own
“feet” much more quickly than they have been in the past. Hopefully the UN will look to
the United States as an example of how they should also use their technology and
resources in order to promote peacebuilding worldwide as America cannot police the
world on its own, no matter how much they would like to. ICT systems are becoming
more and more critical to a nation’s development, and if they are able to get this
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technology into reconstructing nations’ hands and using the aforementioned techniques
learned from Africa and the Middle East, the reconstruction of post-disaster and postconflict nations will reach a new height of efficiency and expediency that the world has
not seen as of yet. It will remain crucial for America to not attempt to swoop in and take
over every system and level of government that might be remaining in the nation, but to
come alongside them and help them back up so that they can regain their national pride,
or even to develop their own independent nation for the first time in their history. This
will cement America’s place, not as the world police, but as the global partner for the
reconstruction of nations and promoter of worldwide freedom.
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